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This article presents evolutionary developmental psychology (EDP) as 
an emerging field of evolutionary psychology (EP). In describing the core ten-
ets of both approaches and the differences between them, we emphasize the 
important roles that evolution and development have in understanding human 
behaviour. We suggest that developmental psychologists should pay more at-
tention to evolutionary issues and, conversely, evolutionary psychologists 
should take development seriously.  
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Cuando el desarrollo importa: de la psicología evolucionista a la 
psicología evolucionista del desarrollo 
 
Este artículo presenta la psicología evolucionista del desarrollo (PED) 
como una perspectiva que emerge de la psicología evolucionista (PE). Al des-
cribir las asunciones principales de ambos enfoques, así como sus diferencias, 
se enfatiza la importancia que la evolución y el desarrollo tienen para la com-
prensión del comportamiento humano. Se sugiere que los psicólogos del desa-
rrollo deberían prestar más atención a las cuestiones evolucionistas y, a la in-
versa, los psicólogos evolucionistas deberían tomar el desarrollo en serio. 
Palabras clave: psicología evolucionista del desarrollo, psicología evo-
lucionista, psicología del desarrollo, teoría de la evolución. 
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Evolution, psychology and development 
 
 The founders of modern psychology considered their field a life science, 
and this is the approach that many psychologists still take today. Human be-
haviour and cognition may be understood in terms of the actions and reactions 
of individuals within the ecological or environmental conditions in which they 
live. Early psychologists and early developmental psychologists had a fascina-
tion with Darwin’s theory of evolution and an interest in using an evolutionary 
perspective to better understand human behaviour and its development (e.g., 
Boring, 1950; Cairns, 1983). Their argument was quite simple: if evolution by 
natural selection applies equally to all living species and traits, it should be 
applicable to human behaviour as well.  
 Evolutionary ideas had been formulated and proposed before Darwin, but 
it was not until 1859, when he published Origin of Species, that they began to 
be taken seriously. It is important to note that evolution is a fact, and that natu-
ral selection, as formulated by Darwin, is its most tenable explanatory mecha-
nism. The basic tenets of evolution by natural selection are not difficult to 
understand. The process depends on the following four factors: 1) there are 
more members of a species in each generation than can actually survive (su-
perfecundity); 2) there are significant differences in physical and behavioural 
traits among individuals within species (variation); 3) this variation is herita-
ble (through genetic mechanisms; although Mendelian genetics were still un-
known during Darwin’s time); and 4) those traits that best promote survival 
and reproduction increase in frequency within the population, while those that 
create opposition to these basic goals of life decrease (natural selection). Or-
ganisms act to maximize their inclusive fitness, which is a measure of repro-
ductive success that includes their direct progeny as well as the offspring of 
relatives, with whom they share genes (Hamilton, 1964). Modern Darwinian 
theory, also known as the Modern Synthesis, was developed in the middle of 
the 20th century by prominent biologists including Dobzhansky (1937), Mayr 
(1942), and Simpson (1944). The Modern Synthesis combines Darwin’s natu-
ral selection with Mendelian inheritance theory to describe the selection of 
characteristics inherited through genetic transmission.  
 The relationship between psychology and evolutionary biology has had 
only limited success for several reasons. First, mainstream psychological 
paradigms of the 1900s such as behaviorism and cognitivism widely ignored 
the role of biology in behaviour for epistemological reasons (Hernández Blasi, 
2000). Second, some evolutionary ideas have been proven wrong, such as 
Ernst Hackel’s “recapitulation theory”, that individual ontogenesis is a recapitu-
lation of a species’ phylogenetic history (“ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny”) 
(see Morss, 1990). Third, except in rare cases (e.g., Bowlby´s attachment the-
ory), most behaviourally oriented evolutionary approaches (ethology, prima-
tology, sociobiology, comparative psychology, animal psychology), despite 
their important insights on human behaviour and development, have not be-
come widely accepted by mainstream psychology (Hernández Blasi & Bjork-
lund, 2003; Hernández Blasi, Bering, & Bjorklund, 2003). 
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 The consequence of this contentious partnership between psychology and 
evolutionary thinking is that still, at the beginning of the 21st century, we 
know very little about the role of evolution in human psychology and devel-
opment. It is in the context of this historical framework that evolutionary psy-
chology (EP) and evolutionary developmental psychology (EDP) originated. 
 
 
Evolutionary psychology: A new science of the mind 
 
 Cosmides and Tooby (1997, pg. 1), two of the leaders of the EP movement, 
stated that “evolutionary psychology is an approach to psychology, in which 
knowledge and principles from evolutionary biology are put to use in research 
on the structure of the human mind. It is not an area of study, like vision, rea-
soning or social behaviour. It is a way of thinking about psychology that can 
be applied to any topic within it”. The human mind is seen as adapted, 
equipped with a series of problem-solving devices (psychological and domain-
specific in nature, often compared to the multiple devices of a Swiss Army 
knife), designed to overcome recurrent problems that ancestral humans faced 
as a hunter-gatherers, such as surviving, mating, parenting, cooperating, and 
competing. These devices, or modules, were shaped through natural selection 
during our evolutionary past, in the context of what is called the Environment 
of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA), and became relatively stable starting on 
approximately 2 million years ago (during the Pleistocene era of geologic 
time). Importantly, these devices are activated unconsciously when needed to 
guide our behaviour. Like the beating of our hearts or the movement of our 
lungs, we are not consciously aware of the underlying processes. In sum, these 
psychological devices are considered implicit, domain-specific information-
processing mechanisms, physically situated within the brain. 
 Cosmides and Tooby (1997) propose that this approach consists of three 
complementary interrelated levels of analysis: adaptive problems, cognitive 
programs, and a neurophysiological basis (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 1. Complementary levels of analyses in evolutionary psychology (adapted from Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1997). Arrows represent the inferences that can be made from one level to another 
 
ADAPTIVE PROBLEM 
COGNITIVE PROGRAM 
(Design of Psychological Mechanisms) 
NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS 
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 EP has often been described in terms of a hybrid of cognitive science and 
evolutionary biology, even called a new science of the mind (Buss, 1999). 
Contrary to traditional interests of cognitive science, EP focuses on problem-
solving strategies involved in survival and reproduction, the cornerstone of 
evolution, and, therefore, of any evolutionary approach. 
 Widely used by evolutionary psychologists to illustrate their perspective are 
the behavioural differences found in the classic Wason task (Wason, 1966) when 
presented in the context of a cognitive task versus when presented in the context 
of a social task. As you may know, in the Wason task four different cards are 
presented to the participants. On one side, each card has a letter (a vowel or a 
consonant); on the other side, each card has a number (even or odd). Participants 
are told, “If there is a vowel on one side, there must be an odd number on the 
other”. Two of the cards initially show letters and the other two show numbers. 
Participants are then instructed, “Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need 
to turn over to see if the rule mentioned has or has not been accomplished”. In the 
socially relevant context, participants are presented with a similar situation, but 
the contents of the cards are different. On one side of the cards, an alcoholic or 
non-alcoholic drink is pictured (e.g., beer; coke); on the other side, the card indi-
cates the age of a person (e.g., 16 years old; 25 years old). The rule in this con-
text states, “If a person is drinking beer, then he must be 21 years old”, and par-
ticipants are asked to indicate which cards should be turned to evaluate this rule. 
 Replications of this experiment in most of the countries studied (see e.g., 
Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) revealed the same pattern of re-
sults: while only about 25% of people succeeded at this task in the cognitive 
context, about 75% of people succeed in the social context, even though both 
tasks are based on the same logical if-then rules. One might argue that these 
findings are because of the abstract versus concrete nature of the situation, but 
this seems not to be the case. Variations on the procedure show clearly that 
success reaches the same high rate only when solving the task required indi-
viduals to detect the breaking of a social rule (i.e., detecting cheaters). 
 Cosmides and Tooby (1992) argue that while the social situation had acti-
vated an ancient and very specific cognitive mechanism for detecting cheaters 
who violate social rules, no such mechanism had evolved to address the problem 
encountered in the cognitive context; individuals are therefore unprepared for it, 
and this contributes to their low success rate. They conclude that cognition is 
not based on domain-general mechanisms (e.g., a “general problem solver”), 
but that it requires a series of domain-specific ones, activated unconsciously 
and targeted to the solution of “real” problems from our evolutionary history. 
 These and other basic tenets of EP, as well as updated summaries of typi-
cal research topics, can be found in various sources (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides 
& Tooby, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, 2005; Buss, 2005, 2007).  
 While evolutionary psychologists take a functional perspective and pro-
vide explanations of why certain behaviours are adaptive, it is important to 
note that, from an EP perspective, not every psychological trait qualifies as an 
adaptation (i.e., a strategy designed through natural selection to address a spe-
cific problem) (Buss et al., 1998). For example, the umbilical cord is an adap-
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tation that solves the problem of feeding the fetus while in the mother’s 
womb. However, the bellybutton has no adaptive function by itself and is 
therefore a by-product of the umbilical cord, in this case a remnant of its exis-
tence. Additionally, traits such as the shape of individual belly buttons are 
considered, in EP terms, noise, because they are entirely random characteristics. 
 Adaptations emerged to solve problems that were frequent to early hu-
mans, but traits that were adaptive during our evolution are not necessarily 
adaptive today because we no longer face all of the problems of ancestors. For 
example, the desire for sugary food, something extremely adaptive during a 
time in which scarcity of resources was the norm, nowadays is a mechanism 
that contributes to obesity in modern well-fed societies. Likewise, evolutionary 
thinking cannot always be successfully applied to relatively modern human 
behaviours, like reading or driving, because these behaviours were not subject 
to evolutionary pressures in the EEA. 
 As any emerging field or approach, EP has been the target of criticism. 
We believe that, in some cases, these criticisms have been unfair. For exam-
ple, as findings of evolutionary psychology can sometimes point out “incon-
venient truths” concerning the human condition (at least according to contem-
porary societal values), some people feel uncomfortable about certain ideas 
proposed by EP and may even believe that evolutionary psychologists are 
trying to justify morally or politically unacceptable behaviour (e.g., that men 
and women have different psychological considerations because males and 
females filled different roles in ancient times). This attitude toward EP is reflec-
tive of the naturalistic fallacy, the assumption that what is natural is justifiable 
and appropriate. However, evolutionary researchers agree that understanding 
the past does not justify the present or the future; just because a behaviour or 
cognition has evolved does not make it acceptable. In fact, precisely because 
we prefer some behavioural outcomes to others, we put conscious social and 
cultural pressures on them. For instance, we value contemporarily relevant 
skills, such as reading and mathematics, and therefore expect children to attend 
school to become proficient in these domains. 
 Disdain for EP pervades certain academic groups within the social sci-
ences, which feel particularly uncomfortable with any application of biologi-
cal knowledge to psychology and social relations. Their attitude is reminiscent 
of the opinion of Lady Ashley, an English aristocrat who lived in the late 19th 
century. When told about Darwin’s theory, Lady Ashley allegedly declared, 
“Let’s hope it’s not true; but if it is true, let’s hope it does not become widely 
known”. Since the inception of EP, some leading evolutionary psychologists 
have considered these groups as representatives of what they call the Standard 
Social Science Model (SSSM) (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). 
 There is also fervent debate within the field itself. Evolutionary psy-
chologists argue about whether all adaptations are domain-specific in nature or 
if there are domain-general mechanisms at work as well, whether all adapta-
tions are preformed (or not), and about the roles that environment and develop-
ment play in our evolved psychology (Bjorklund, 2003; Buss & Reeve, 2003; 
Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003).  
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Evolutionary developmental psychology: Development matters 
 
 Evolutionary Developmental Psychology (EDP) focuses on evolutionary 
analyses of infancy, childhood, and adolescent development, as well as parenting 
behaviour that has evolved to ensure the care of developing children. From an 
adaptationist perspective, the goals of EDP are the same as EP but focused on 
a specific part of the human lifespan. Evolutionary developmental psycholo-
gists aim to discover which behavioural and cognitive traits in the developing 
child are true adaptations designed to increase chances of survival to adult-
hood and which are by-products, as well as which traits in adults have been 
shaped to support successful maturation of offspring. Studying these issues 
will give us an understanding of the “whys” of human development that is 
more complete than what EP or developmental psychology alone can provide, 
and it will enhance our understanding of the “hows” of adult behaviour and 
development. 
 In this context, we can describe EDP as an approach that is interested in 
making an evolutionary analysis of development, as well as an epigenetic 
analysis of evolution. More specifically, EDP has been defined as “the appli-
cation of the basic principles of Darwinian evolution, particularly, natural 
selection, to explain contemporary human development. It involves the study 
of the genetic and environmental mechanisms that underlie the universal de-
velopment of social and cognitive competencies and the evolved epigenetic 
(gene-environment interactions) that adapt these competences to local condi-
tions; it assumes that not only behaviours and cognitions that characterize 
adults are the product of selection pressures operating over the course of evo-
lution, but so are characteristics of children’s behaviours and minds” (Bjork-
lund & Pellegrini, 2002, p. 4).  
 EDP takes into account the interaction between organisms and their envi-
ronments in the development of phenotypic characteristics. This interactionist 
approach reflects the perspective of dynamic systems theory, which describes 
development as a bidirectional interplay between genes and environment at all 
levels of the developmental system, from the genetic through the cultural 
(Gottlieb, 2002; Thelen & Smith, 2006). This model provides a dialectical 
view of human development, as traits emerge from the interaction of an indi-
vidual and his or her environment. From this perspective development is no 
longer thought of in the classical framework of nature versus nurture, but instead 
is construed as nature via nurture. 
 Such an explanatory model provides important contributions to EP, which 
often fails to recognize the critical processes underlying the production of 
adult behaviour and cognition. While evolutionary psychologists typically ac-
knowledge the importance of the environment in the development of evolved 
mechanisms, they often relegate the environment to the role of a mere “trig-
gering mechanism” for genetically hardwired programs of behaviour (e.g. 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) rather than a creative force in the development of 
these programs (Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003). EP acknowledges development, 
but views evolved cognitive mechanisms as reliably developing characteristics, 
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which assumes that development will produce the same results in all individuals. 
While a species-typical environment will produce species-typical individuals, not 
all individuals experience the same approximation of this environment. Instead 
of assuming that evolved mechanisms are innate and lie dormant until trig-
gered into action during adulthood, EDP asks how these inherited mechanisms 
develop and come to be expressed in the phenotypes of adults through interaction 
between individuals and their environments. For example, social experiences 
during childhood affect hormone levels, which have lasting effects on brain 
development in relation to social interaction. Children who grow up with posi-
tive social experiences will be better prepared to navigate the social landscape 
as adults than children who grow up with negative social experiences (Flinn, 
2006; Flinn & Ward, 2005). Individuals with fewer social skills may have 
more difficulty forming bonds and finding mates than individuals with greater 
aptitude for social interaction.  
 It may be unfair to criticize EP for neglecting development when they 
have chosen a level of analysis that initially does not require such an explana-
tory basis and is a valid and productive point of view (see Bjorklund, 2003). 
However, in ignoring development, we believe they may be overlooking a 
relevant perspective that will allow them to better understand their focus: the 
adaptations implemented in adulthood.  
 The primary focus of EDP is the development of individuals during 
childhood. All mammals pass through infancy and a juvenile period, but the 
youthful phase of development is particularly important for species that are 
born highly immature and require a long period of nurturing and adult care in 
order to survive and develop into adulthood. Especially in primates and most 
notably in humans, this period is significantly longer than in other species. For 
example, within primates, the more recently a species shared a common an-
cestor with Homo sapiens, the longer is its juvenile period: approximately 2 
years in lemurs, 4 years in macaques, 8 years in chimpanzees, and about 15 
years in humans (Poirier & Smith, 1974). It is our contention that natural se-
lection has had a greater effect on the early phases of the lifespan than on the 
later phases. Childhood can have lasting effects on later life and is important 
in and of itself. Therefore, evolution has equipped children with adaptations to 
survive this essential but potentially dangerous time during their lives. Be-
cause juvenile development impacts later life, during which much of our 
evolved psychology is expressed, an evolutionary analysis of development is 
necessary to fully understand the origins of human nature.  
 Applying an evolutionary perspective to development requires the intro-
duction of several basic tenets that integrate the two parent fields of EDP (see 
Table 1). As often happens in the process of articulating any hybrid discipline 
in science, there is a tendency among the practitioners of the mother disci-
plines (developmental psychology and evolutionary psychology, in this case) 
to think that there is relatively little that is actually novel in the “new” ap-
proach (just some basic evolutionary tenets in the case of developmental psy-
chology; just some developmental considerations in the case of evolutionary 
psychology). What comes from one’s own field is already known, and the 
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inclusion of the “new” field makes little difference to how one thinks. Al-
though we understand such thinking, we believe that evolutionary develop-
mental psychology is not simply the sum of evolutionary and developmental 
psychology, but a true integration of the two. We prefer to think that some-
times the whole is more than the sum of the parts, and that, in this particular 
case, the blend of some assumptions from both disciplines may produce an 
innovative and fruitful approach.  
 
TABLE 1. SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
 As we mentioned earlier, central to EDP is the idea that all psychologi-
cally important characteristics emerge dynamically over time as a result of a 
continuous and bidirectional interaction between the organism and its envi-
ronment. Perhaps equally central to an EDP perspective is that natural selec-
tion affects all stages of development, not only adulthood. EDP proposes that 
three distinct types of adaptations have been selected to operate during child-
hood. 
 Ontogenetic adaptations are specific to a certain period in development 
and serve an adaptive function during this time, but then disappear when they are 
no longer needed (Bjorklund, 1997; Oppenheim, 1981). The umbilical cord men-
tioned earlier is clearly an ontogenetic adaptation, providing prenatal nutrients 
during gestation but unnecessary after birth. A candidate for a behavioural 
ontogenetic adaptation is neonatal imitation of facial gestures, which appears 
shortly after birth but declines to chance levels after 2 months of age (Meltzoff 
& Moore, 1977; Nagy & Molnar, 2004). This behaviour may facilitate nursing 
(Jacobson, 1979) or function to foster interaction between the newborn and the 
mother (Bjorklund, 1987).  
 In contrast, deferred adaptations serve to prepare children in some way 
for adult life. For example, girls and boys have different play styles that, in 
ancient environments, may have provided practice for the different roles they 
would have as adults (and may still have today for many) (see Bjorklund & 
Hernández Blasi, 2005; Hernández Blasi & Bjorklund, 2003).  
 Conditional adaptations emerge when an individual responds to envi-
ronmental conditions by adjusting behaviour in anticipation of later life 
(Boyce & Ellis, 2005). An example of a conditional adaptation is the “evolu-
tionary theory of socialization” proposed by Belsky, Steinberg, and Draper 
(1991). According to this theory, the type of rearing environment during 
1. All evolved characteristics develop via continuous and bidirectional gene-environment interactions 
that emerge dynamically over time. 
2. Natural selection works at all stages of development, not only during adulthood. 
3. Some characteristics of infants and children were selected to serve an adaptive function at specific 
times in development and not as preparations for adulthood. 
4. Children’s adaptations show a certain degree of plasticity or flexibility, the ability to change in 
response to different ecological or environmental conditions. 
5. An extended childhood is needed in which to learn the complexities of human social communities. 
6. Both domain-specific and domain-general mechanisms have been shaped by natural selection. 
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childhood predicts the timing of pubertal development and the type of mating/ 
reproductive strategy a person engages in as an adult, at least for females. 
Girls who grow up in father-absent, resource-scarce environments and establish 
insecure attachment relationships with their parents reach sexual maturity sooner 
and engage in sexual behaviour earlier than girls who experience more posi-
tive home environments. As adults, such girls are more likely to establish 
short-term mating relationships, have more offspring, and invest relatively 
little in those offspring compared to slower developing girls who experienced 
early home environments with adequate resources and secure and predictable 
relationships (see Ellis, 2004, 2005). Although it is tempting to view the for-
mer pattern of development as maladaptive and the latter as adaptive, that is 
true only from the perspective of contemporary culture. From a Darwinian 
perspective, girls whose early home environments are harsh and whose rela-
tionships are unpredictable can anticipate similar conditions as adults. Given 
the likely nature of their future environment, their inclusive fitness could best 
be served by accelerating sexual maturity, reproducing early and often, and 
investing relatively little in the offspring they have, similar to the r reproduc-
tive strategy of some species. In contrast, girls who experience supportive and 
predictable environments as children can anticipate similar environments as 
adults, and their inclusive fitness is best served by delaying sexual maturity, 
establishing long-term bonds with a mate, and investing substantially in the 
few offspring they have. In these cases, early experience entrains development 
in a direction that is apt to be adaptive, assuming ecological conditions remain 
constant. Children’s developmental trajectory is not random, but directed to-
ward an outcome that, assuming environmental stability, is likely to be adap-
tive (or would have been adaptive to our ancestors). 
 We have simplified the details of this theory (see e.g., Ellis, 2004, 2005, 
for a more updated and contrasted view on this topic), but the important point 
here is that a selected adaptive trait (reproductive behaviour) can become ex-
pressed in more than one way, depending on the ecological conditions experi-
enced by individuals during early development. In other words, what finally 
becomes expressed in the adult phenotype is not just an automatic activation 
of adaptive cognitive mechanisms, but rather a conditional implementation 
that depends on experiences within the early ecological environment, which 
interacts bidirectionally with the individual at multiple levels of the organism-
environment system. EDP proposes that traits do not become expressed by the 
direct reading of a genetic “blueprint”, as espoused by many evolutionary 
psychologists. Individuals are not born with behavioural characteristics pre-
formed (Bjorklund, 2003). Rather, the expression of evolutionarily selected 
traits takes place within a certain space (i.e., sociocultural and ecological con-
ditions), and throughout a certain time (individual development). 
 Conditional adaptations such as Belsky and colleagues socialization theory 
reflect the high degree of plasticity of many human characteristics. While some 
traits are highly canalized and therefore develop with little deviation across 
individuals (except for those who experience extremely atypical environ-
ments), other traits can be highly flexible in response to environmental pertur-
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bations. The lengthy duration of the human maturational period means a high 
possibility that developing individuals will experience dramatic environmental 
change during infancy, childhood, and adolescence. Juveniles must adjust to 
these changes to maximize their chances of survival and the development of 
adaptive adult reproductive strategies. Therefore, children have been evolu-
tionarily prepared for unpredictable environments with a high degree of plasticity, 
or flexibility, that allows them to adapt, in constrained ways, to changing cir-
cumstances (Boyce & Ellis, 2005; Ellis, Jackson & Boyce, 2006).  
 This high degree of plasticity implies that domain-general mechanisms, in 
addition to domain-specific ones, have also undergone selection pressure. Ex-
amples of domain-general mechanisms that foster behavioural plasticity in-
clude speed of processing, working memory, and “g”, or a general intelligence 
factor (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002; Geary, 2005; Geary & Huffman, 2002). 
Such mechanisms are necessary for high levels of learning. For a long-lived 
and extremely social species such as humans, learning is of great importance 
because it allows us to develop the skills necessary to succeed in the complex 
social landscape of human groups. Our lengthy developmental period provides 
us with the time necessary to mature into socially competent adults. This pro-
longed period of maturation comes at a high cost to developing individuals, 
who are entirely dependent on others for their care and protection, without 
which they become vulnerable to predation and starvation. Basic evolutionary 
theory predicts that a trait that accrues such a high cost will provide an even 
larger benefit or it would not have been selected for. The extended juvenile 
period has great adaptive value because it provides developing children the 
time needed to learn the complexities of human social communities (see 
Bjorklund, 1997, 2007, for details). 
 In sum, although EP and EDP typically focus on different phases of the 
lifespan (EP in adulthood and EDP in childhood) and EDP places greater em-
phasis on an interactionist explanatory model of the development of cognitive 
mechanisms than EP, these perspectives share a common view that human 
behaviour and development should be approached from an evolutionary perspec-
tive.  
 
 
Three levels of analysis of human development 
 
 An EDP perspective relies on an interactionist view of development, that 
traits emerge from the bidirectional relationship between individuals and their 
environments. This perspective on the relationship between evolution and 
development requires analysis on three distinct levels. Every human psycho-
logical trait has a phylogenetic history (beginning approximately 2 million years 
ago, during the Pleistocene era, when human modern traits were shaped), a 
sociocultural history (beginning for modern humans 10.000 years ago, when 
agriculture made possible the birth of modern culture), and an ontogenetic 
history (the developmental path of each individual). Therefore, to properly 
understand the evolution of human psychology, it is necessary to analyze be-
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haviour on each of these three levels (see Figure 2) (Bjorkund & Hernández 
Blasi, in preparation; Cole, 2006). An obvious implication of this approach is 
that development cannot be understood unless viewed from all levels of analy-
sis. An ontogenetic perspective is only one piece of the explanatory puzzle; 
we must also take into account the information provided by phylogenetic and 
sociocultural perspectives, as well as the interactions between all three of 
these levels for a comprehensive explanation of development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Levels of analyses of psychological development (adapted from Bjorklund & Hernández 
Blasi, in preparation). Any contemporary psychological trait can only be properly understood 
if its past phylogenetic and sociohistorical pressures (two distal levels of analysis), and its 
present ecological pressures (a proximal level of analysis) when the trait is expressed during 
ontogeny are taken into account. At every level, development progresses through bidirectional 
interactions between genes, brain/behaviour and the environment. 
 
 If, as proposed by EDP, there is no automatic implementation of adaptive 
traits during adulthood but rather a progressive bidirectional interaction of 
genes and environment at the three levels of analysis described above, then 
evolutionary psychologists should pay more attention to the roles of develop-
ment and culture than they currently do. Accordingly, we suggest that in order 
to become both a good (adult) psychologist and/or evolutionary psychologist, 
one may aspire to be a good developmentalist and/or EDP psychologist. 
 Just as EP provides an overarching perspective (i.e., a meta-theory) for 
psychology, EDP should be considered an approach or way of thinking about 
psychological development and evolution rather than a specific theory or area 
of study itself. Like any new perspective in science, it legitimately aspires to: 
“(1) help to reorganize old findings in a manner that generates new under-
standings; (2) generate new and testable hypotheses; and, as a result, (3) lead 
to new inquiry and new discoveries” (Belsky et al., 1991, p. 664; see also 
Hernández Blasi & Bjorklund, 2003). We feel that, if evolutionary theory has 
successfully served as an umbrella or framework for the structure of modern 
biological science, this should also be the case for modern developmental psy-
chology. However, we do not see EDP as an alternative to any other specific 
theoretical approaches in development, such as those focused on proximate 
developmental influences (Geary & Bjorklund, 2000). On the contrary, we see 
EDP as a potentially useful framework for developmental science that in con-
junction with the necessary perspectives of proximal theories, can acquire a 
truly integrative understanding of psychological development. 
 
 
PHYLOGENY 
(2 million years 
ago and before) 
Function 
SOCIOHISTORY
(from about 10.000 
years ago) 
Cultural History 
ONTOGENY 
(Today) 
Present Development 
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Evolutionary developmental psychology: The new science of development? 
 
 Although the introduction of EDP into the academic arena is relatively 
recent, the field has grown in many ways. Foremost, there has been much pro-
gress in establishing the conceptual and theoretical bases of EDP (e.g., Bjork-
lund & Hernández Blasi, 2005; Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000, 2002; Burgess 
& MacDonald, 2005; Geary, 1998; Geary & Bjorklund, 2000; Hernández 
Blasi et al., 2003). Additionally, specific methodological approaches have 
been established (Hernández Blasi & Bjorklund, 2003) and the EDP perspec-
tive has been applied to an increasing variety of fields, including language 
development (Locke, in press), education (Geary, 2007), family relationships 
(Gardiner & Bjorklund, 2007), and cognitive development (Bjorklund, 2007). 
Efforts are being made to introduce EDP to graduate and undergraduate stu-
dents (Bjorklund & Hernández Blasi, in preparation; Ellis & Bjorklund, 2005), 
as well as to a more general audience (Bjorklund, 2007).  
 As EDP is considered an approach to development rather than a field of 
study in and of itself, we believe an EDP perspective should be expanded to 
encompass all areas of developmental psychology. However, this expansion 
should be more than just theoretical. While a passive empirical strategy may be 
a good starting point as an EDP approach is initially taken, a strong research 
agenda should also be formulated. There is currently an imbalance between 
the amount of theoretical and empirical works published, with theory signifi-
cantly outweighing research. As developmentalists see how an EDP approach 
can enrich traditional perspectives, they must keep in mind how they can test 
their evolutionary hypotheses. Therefore, we encourage developmental psy-
chologists to organize EDP Oriented Research Groups, focused on conducting 
developmental research using evolutionary tenets as a reference, as well as the 
establishment of Evolutionary Developmental Labs that investigate specific 
areas of development using an EDP approach.  
 Any new scientific perspective experiences a period in which it must 
show the scientific community that it presents a valid point of view and that it 
should be accepted and applied. EDP may be passing through this phase right 
now, and it is our challenge to convince developmentalists (and evolutionary 
psychologists) to take its tenets into account. Accordingly, if EDP is to be-
come a “new science of development”, as we provocatively ask in the title of 
this section, it is in our colleagues’ hands. Obviously, as any scientific pro-
posal, our approach is not without criticisms. And, as we have recognized 
elsewhere (Hernández Blasi & Bjorklund, 2003), there is always the possibility 
that, in the process of trying to integrate two well-developed scientific disci-
plines, where so many dynamic perspectives and contents may converge 
(ranging from genetics to anthropology, and from psychology to evolutionary 
biology), we may commit mistakes and/or need to introduce modifications in 
our current theorizing. We want yet to think that the effort is worthwhile.  
 
 We have outlined in this article many reasons that EDP provides an in-
triguing and valid perspective, and here would like to emphasize another: An 
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evolutionary developmental perspective permits scientists to view the children 
and development the way the earth is viewed from the window of a plane. We 
see few details of the ground below, but we get a look at the big picture, which 
can allow us to understand some issues more clearly and easily. That is, we may 
acquire a better understanding of the nature of many developmental phenomena. 
Also, an EDP perspective can be used to provide some practical applications 
to particular behaviours, including child abuse, aggression and violence during 
adolescence, parenting strategies, and reading and math disabilities (see 
Bjorklund & Bering, 2002; Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000; Geary, 2007). 
 The ultimate aim of any evolutionary perspective to psychology or develop-
mental psychology is not surviving as an isolated field. Rather, the goal of an 
evolutionary perspective is to establish a core approach that becomes so fun-
damental to any psychological explanation that finally there is no distinction 
made between EDP and Developmental Psychology or EP and Psychology 
because an evolutionary view creates a metatheory that unites the field (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992; Geary, 2006).  
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